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Abstract. Reliability studies and system health predictions are mostly
based on the use of probability laws to model the failure of components.
Behavior of the components of the system under study is represented by
probability distributions, derived from failure statistics. The parameters
of these laws are assumed to be precise and well known, which is not
always true in practice. Impact of such imprecision on the end result can
be crucial, and requires adequate sensitivity analysis. One way to tackle
this imprecision is to bound such parameters within an interval. This
paper investigates the impact of the uncertainty pervading the values of
law parameters, specifically in fault tree based Safety analysis.
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1 Introduction
This work takes place in the context of an Airbus project called @MOST . The
main aim of the @MOST project is to improve the schedule of operational and
maintenance activities of the aircrafts. This is achieved by using some extended
safety models and by predicting the expected failures. These predictions are
based upon the safety analysis of underlying system models.
One of the objectives of safety analysis is to evaluate the probability of unde-
sired events. In our previous work [1], we studied how to evaluate the imprecision
of this probability when the undesired event is described by a fault tree, and the
probabilities of elementary events are imprecise numbers. In this approach, the
fault tree is a graphical representation of a Boolean formula F , representing
all the conditions of occurrence of the undesired event under study, as a func-
tion of some atomic events. Those atomic events represent the failures of the
components of the system, or possibly some of its configuration states. All of
them are supposed to be stochastically independent. Then the probability of
the undesired event can be computed from the ones of the atomic events, by
⋆ C. Jacob has a grant supported by the @MOST Prototype, a joint project of Airbus,
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means of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [3]: that allows an easy probability
computation for very large Boolean functions.
In safety analysis, as well in reliability studies, the probabilities of the atomic
events are time-dependent, and generally described by means of some standard
probability distributions [4], e.g. exponential or Weibull law. Their parameters
are supposed to be precisely known numbers, but actually, they generally come
from statistical observations of failure times. They are derived by means of data
fitting methods and regression analysis: for example, the paper [5] explains how
to use different methods, like least squares or the actuary method, in order to
find the best parameters of a Weibull law that fit some samples.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of imprecision in parameters of
probability distributions commonly used in safety analysis, by using intervals
values for the parameters. First of all, we study the impact on the probability
distributions themselves: p-boxes [6] are obtained, i.e. minimum and maximum
probability distributions bounding the real one. In a second step, an extension of
the algorithm described in paper [1] is used to evaluate the imprecise probability
of a Boolean formula depending on several p-boxes. In this work, we compute
the output p-box attached to undesired events.
The paper is organized as follow: section 2 introduces the basic concepts
of reliability. Sections 3 and 4 present the resulting ranges of the cumulative
distribution of an atomic event for, respectively, exponential law and Weibull
law. At last, section 5 explains the computation of the range of undesired event
probability across time (cumulative distribution), in function of the distributions
of the atomic events leading to this undesired event. A case study illustrates
this section. Finally, the last section presents some conclusions and future work.
2 Basics of Reliability study
The reliability R(t) of a system, also called the survival function, is the proba-
bility that the system does not fail before time t. It can be expressed as:
R(t) = P (T > t) (1)
where T is a random variable representing the failure date.
The probability of failure of a system before time t, FT (t) = P (T ≤ t), is the
complement of its reliability:
FT (t) = 1−R(t) (2)
FT (t) is called failure distribution.
The failure density function fT (t) expresses the probability that the system
fails between t and t+ dt:
fT (t)dt = P (t ≤ T < t+ dt) (3)
The failure rate λ of a system is the frequency of its failure. It is a function of
the system health state, and in general it is time dependent. λ is often considered
as proportional to the probability that a failure occurs at a specified time point
t, given that no failure occurred before this time:
λ(t)dt = P (t ≤ T ≤ t+ dt | T > t) (4)
This conditional probability can be written as:
λ(t)dt =
fT (t)dt
R(t)
=
−R′(t)
R(t)
, (5)
where R′(t) is the derivative of R(t) with respect to the time.
The solution of this differential equation is:
ln(R(t)) =
∫ t
0
λ(u)du+ c,where c is a constant. (6)
Hence, the reliability expressed in terms of the failure rate has the expression:
R(t) = e−
∫
t
0
λ(u)du (7)
In the following text, we will present two particular cases of failure rates in
equation (7), leading to the following distributions:
– exponential distribution
– Weibull distribution
Furthermore, we will study the impact of the lack of knowledge about failure
rates on those distributions.
In reliability studies, the probabilities of all events are assumed to be well
known, which is not always verified in practice. Making this assumption has
shown some limitation, therefore, some researchers started to work on other
methods, using intervals instead of precise values. Utkin and Coolen, for ex-
ample, worked on imprecise reliability using imprecise probability theory, with
upper and lower expectations instead of a single probability value [2]. They
studied imprecise monotonic fault trees, and also the impact of some compo-
nents failure over the system under study by mean of imprecise importance
measures.
In this paper, the goal is to compute the probability distribution of an un-
desired event described by any binary fault tree, monotonic or not. Those kinds
of fault trees are often met in software using automatic fault tree generation, or
systems with reconfiguration states. The impact of imprecision about the dis-
tribution of the undesired event depends on the architecture of the system, and
on the imprecision about the parameters of the probability distributions of its
elementary components. Hence, the first step is to study the impact of imprecise
parameters on the commonly used probability distributions.
3 The exponential distribution
Recall that the reliability analysis of an aircraft takes into account, among oth-
ers, the electronic components. Their probabilities of failure are modeled with
constant failure rates, because they do not have any burn-in nor any wear-out
periods, respectively at their beginning and their end of life. Moreover, when
the failure rate is constant, λ(t) = λ, equation (7) becomes R(t) = e−λt, that is
an exponential distribution.
The probability density function is given by:
fT (t) = λe
−λt (8)
And is represented in Fig. 1.a). Its cumulative distribution, depicted in
Fig. 1.b) is given by:
FT (t) = 1− e
−λt (9)
Fig. 1. a) Exponential density function b) Cumulative distribution
3.1 Exponential law with imprecise failure rate
If the only information available about the failure rate λ is an interval containing
it, then there are different probability distributions representing the failure of
the component, as will be presented in the sequel.
The goal is to find the range of the cumulative distribution, when the failure
rate is imprecise: λ ∈ [λ, λ]. In interval analysis, knowing the monotonicity of a
function makes the determination of its range straightforward.
The function 1 − e−λt is strictly increasing with λ, hence the range of the
cumulative distribution, when λ is varying, for every t > 0 and λ > 0, is given
by the expression:
FT (t) = {1− e
−λt, s.t. λ ∈ [λ, λ]} = [1− e−λt, 1− e−λt] (10)
The range of the cumulative distribution with respect to some values of λ and
in time interval t = [0, 10] is represented in Fig. 2.a).
For the probability density function, it is a little bit more complex. The
derivative with respect to λ of the function fT (t) is:
∂
∂λ
fT (t) = (1− λt)e
−λt (11)
This means that the function will be increasing with respect to λ when λt < 1,
and decreasing otherwise. The range of the function will depend on λ and t, as
illustrated on Fig. 2.b).
Fig. 2. a) Range of the cumulative distribution b) Range of the probability
distribution (0.1 < λ < 0.3, 0 < t < 10)
In the following, we give different interpretations of the probability of failure
of a component, as used in fault tree analysis.
3.2 Occurrence of an atomic failure before time t
In the quantitative analysis of a safety model, each component (or type of compo-
nent) of this model will have its own failure rate, and its own failure probability.
The main goal of this analysis is to ensure that, at each time t, the probability
that the system has failed remains below a certain value. Hence, the cumulative
distribution will be the one used for our computations, since it represents the
probability of failure of a component or system before time t.
So when the parameter λ is imprecise, and its possible values are known to
lie within the interval [λ, λ], the probability distribution will be contained in the
p-box [6]:
{P, P (T < t) ∈ [1− e−λt, 1− e−λt]} (12)
The p-box contains more probability distributions than those with an ex-
ponential distribution. However it is enough to use the p-box when computing
probability bounds of events of the form T < t.
3.3 Occurrence of an atomic failure between t1 and t2
In some cases, it can also be interesting to compute the probability that the
event will occur between two dates t1 and t2. This can be expressed as the
conditional probability t1 < T < t2 given that T does not occur before t1:
P (T < t2|T ≥ t1) =
e−λt1 − e−λt2
1− e−λt1
(13)
When λ ∈ [λ, λ], the partial derivative of P (T < t2|T ≥ t1) with respect to λ
must be computed in order to find the p-box of the probability distribution.
∂
∂λ
P (T < t2|T ≥ t1) =
t2e
−λt2 − t1e
−λt1
(1− e−λt1)2
(14)
By noticing that the function xe−λx is decreasing with x when λ is fixed, we
can deduce that ∂
∂λ
P (T < t2|T ≥ t1) is strictly negative. Hence, the p-box
containing the probability that the event occurs between t1 and t2 is:
P (T < t2|T ≥ t1) ∈
[
e−λt1 − e−λt2
1− e−λt1
,
e−λt1 − e−λt2
1− e−λt1
]
. (15)
3.4 Case of periodic preventive maintenance
It is also possible to represent schedules of preventive maintenance by means of
probability distributions. Indeed, some components are preventively replaced or
repaired with a period of length θ: this maintenance task will reset the prob-
ability of failure to 0 after θ flight hours (FH). The cumulative distribution
representing this probability of failure in this case is a periodic function that can
be written as:
for k ∈ N, P (T < t) = 1− e−λ(t−kθ), if t ∈ [kθ, (k + 1)θ] (16)
When the failure rate λ is imprecise, then the result is the same as in the
section 3.2 on the interval [0, θ]:
for k ∈ N, P (T < t) ∈ [1− e−λ(t−kθ), 1− e−λ(t−kθ)], if t ∈ [kθ, (k + 1)θ] (17)
If both the failure rate and the period are imprecise, then it is still possible to
compute the range of the resulting distribution: we can consider that the period
θ can be any value in the interval of time [θ1, θ2]. In this case, the size of the
interval probability will grow very quickly with the size of the interval [θ1, θ2].
The minimum and maximum cumulative distributions, denoted by P (F < t)
and P (F < t), are given for k ∈ N by the following expressions:
P (T < t) =
{
0 for kθ1 < t < kθ2
1− e−λ(t−kθ1), for t ∈ [kθ2, (k + 1)θ1]
P (T < t) = 1− e−λ(t−kθ1), for t ∈ [kθ2, (k + 1)θ2]
An example of those p-boxes for λ ∈ [0.5, 0.6] and T ∈ [θ1, θ2] is shown on
Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. An example of periodic maintenance with θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] and λ ∈ [0.5, 0.6]
4 Weibull distribution and imprecise parameters
In the case of a hardware component, it can be useful to model its burn-in period
(i.e. the fact that the failure rate is high at the beginning but will decrease after
some time) and its wear-out phase (i.e. the fact that after some time, the failure
rate of the component increases). Therefore, the failure rate will have the shape
of a bathtub curve, as shown on Fig.4.
Fig. 4. Bathtub Curve
In order to model the reliability in this case, the Weibull law is used. It is a
two parameters law, described by the formula:
R(t) = e−(
t
η
)β (18)
where η is the scale parameter and β the shape parameter.
The probability density function of a Weibull law is given by the expression:
fT (t) =
β
η
(
t
η
)β−1e−(
t
η
)β (19)
And its cumulative distribution is:
FT (t) = 1− e
−( t
η
)β (20)
From equation (5), the expression of the failure rate as a function of t is:
λ(t) = β.
1
ηβ
.tβ−1 (21)
To get a bathtub curve, a value β1 < 1 is chosen for the burn-in phase (t0
to t1), β = 1 for the useful life (t1 to t2) and a β2 > 1 for the wear-out phase
(> t2).
In the wear-out phase, the reference origin of the failure rate and the cumu-
lative function is not 0, hence in order to be able to shift the distribution to
starting time t2, a location parameter γ should be added:
FT (t) = 1− e
−( t−γ
η
)β (22)
Despite the fact that the parameter β is different for at each phase of the
bathtub curve, the failure rate is a continuous function. Therefore, there will
be a constraint for each change of phase, that will ensure the continuity. When
the scale parameter η remains the same for all the phases, this constraint is
expressed as below:{
β1.
1
ηβ1
.tβ1−11 =
1
η
β2.
1
ηβ2
.(t2 − γ)
β2−1 = 1
η
⇔
{
β1.(
t1
η
)β1−1 = 1
β2.(
(t2−γ)
η
)β2−1 = 1
(23)
Like the failure rate curve, the global cumulative distribution will be com-
posed of three pieces of cumulative distributions with different parameters. To
ensure the continuity of the global one, the cumulative distribution of each new
phase should start from the last value of the previous phase.
When the parameters of a Weibull law are imprecise, they should still verify
the constraints of β being less than, greater than, or equal to 1 for each phase,
and the ones expressing the continuity of λ(t) (equation 23). Fig. 5 shows the
variation of the failure rate with the variation of η, when β is fixed, for the three
different phases of the bathtub curve.
. a) β1 < 1 . b) β = 1 . c) β2 > 1
Fig. 5. Variation of the Weibull distribution with η for a fixed β.
The imprecision pervading the parameters of the Weibull law affects the value
of the time points where the phases change in the bathtub curve (t1 and t2), due
to equation (23). These time points become themselves intervals.
In order to find the range of the cumulative distribution with the different
parameters, the monotonicity study of the function will also be required, as in
section 3. In this case, we have a two parameter function, hence we compute its
gradient.
−→
∇P (T < t) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∂
∂η
P (T < t)
∂
∂β
P (T < t)
=
∣∣∣∣∣β.
tβ
ηβ+1
e−(
t
η
)β
ln( t
η
).( t
η
)βe−(
t
η
)β
(24)
By noticing that t, η, β and e−(
t
η
)β are always positive, we can conclude
that the partial derivative ∂
∂η
P (T < t) is positive. But the partial derivative
∂
∂β
P (T < t) is positive when η > t and negative otherwise, because of the term
ln( t
η
). Equation (23) implies that for η > t1, hence P (T < t) is decreasing with
respect to β for t < t1. This means that the p-box of a Weibull distribution will
be:
[1− e
−( t
η
)β
, 1− e−(
t
η
)β ], for t ∈ [0, t1] (25)
Between t1 and t2, β is fixed to 1, hence the bounds for the cumulative
distribution are:
[1− e
−
t−t1
η + P (T < t1), 1− e
−
t−t1
η + P (T < t1)], for t ∈ [t1, t2] (26)
When t > t2, the quantity (t2 − γ) is computed through equation (23). Now
the partial derivatives are similar to the ones in equation (24), replacing t by
t − γ. Hence the condition for ∂
∂β
P (T < t) being positive is that t < γ + η, so
we get the range of the cumulative distribution:
[1− e
−( t−γ
η
)β
+ P (T < t2), 1− e
−(
t−t2
η
)β + P (T < t2)], for t < γ + η (27)
[1− e
−( t−γ
η
)β
+ P (T < t2), 1− e
−(
t−t2
η
)β + P (T < t2)], for t > γ + η (28)
5 Range of a undesired event probability across time
In the case of fault tree analysis, the probability of a undesired event is described
with a Boolean formula F , function of N Boolean variables Vi, i = 1 . . . N rep-
resenting the failure (or states) of its components. When the probability of Vi is
represented by a probability distribution with an imprecise parameter, we have
a p-box for the probability of the undesired event. The variables Vi are supposed
to be stochastically independent, and they can follow different probability dis-
tributions. Also, their parameters can be of different types: some can be precise,
when the information is available and well known, some can be imprecise.
The goal will be to find the p-box describing the undesired event probability
across time from the p-boxes of the variables Vi. The best way to carry out this
computation is to discretize the time, and to find for each t and for each Vi,
the associated interval I(t, Vi). Of course, if all input probability distributions
are precise, the probability of the undesired event will be precise. When Ti is
a random variable representing the failure time of the component Vi, we have
that:
Ii(t, Vi) = [P (Ti < t), P (Ti < t)]
Let us consider three variables Vi, i = 1 . . . 3, with exponential laws, and
respective imprecise parameters λ1 ∈ [0.35, 0.45], λ2 ∈ [0.2, 0.4] and λ3 ∈
[0.55, 0.6]. Fig. 6 depicts the intervals Ii(t = 7, Vi) associated to these variables.
Fig. 6. Example of aggregation at t of three exponential p-boxes
For the same time point, the range of the probability of variable Vi is given
by the interval Ii(t, Vi). So, for this time t, the algorithm presented in [1] can
be used to compute the probability of the undesired event.
In order to compute the range of the cumulative distribution of the undesired
event for all time instants, we apply the algorithm for all k time instants, k = To
Ts
,
where To is the observation interval and Ts is the time step.
5.1 Case study: Safety model of a Primary/Backup Switch
In this case study, the analysis process of Safety models used in the @MOST
project will be described. We will take the example of a small system allowing
a reconfiguration: a Primary/Backup Switch. It is constituted of three compo-
nents:
– A primary supplier
– A back-up supplier
– A switch that selects the active supplier between the primary or the backup
one
When a fault occurs in the Primary supplier, then it switches to the Back-up
supplier. But it may also happen that the Switch gets stuck: in this case, it will
be impossible to switch to Backup supplier.
The software Ce´cilia OCAS is used to model the architecture and the be-
havior of the system thanks to the AltaRica language, which is mode-automata
based. From this description, some algorithms [7] will extract fault trees or Min-
imal Cut Sets for any undesired event selected by the user by means of observers.
Fig.7 shows the OCAS model of the Primary/Backup Switch.
Fig. 7. OCAS model of the Primary/Backup Switch
In the following, we will study the undesired event corresponding to the fact
that the whole system is down, written as Obs.KO. The OCAS tool extracts the
fault tree associated to this event, as displayed on Fig.8.
Fig. 8. fault tree associated to event Obs.KO
Therefore, this fault tree is equivalent to the Boolean formula:
Obs.KO = P.Fail ∧ (B.Fail ∨ (S.stuck ∧ ¬S.activeB)),
where P.Fail stands for a failure of the Primary supplier and B.Fail for a failure
of the Backup supplier. S.stuck represents the fact that the Switch is stuck and
is not able to activate the Backup, and S.activeB is the activation order of the
Switch.
The sensitivity analysis algorithm is applied to the fault tree, with the fol-
lowing imprecise parameters for the distributions:
– P.Fail possesses an exponential distribution with an imprecise failure rate
λ = 10−4+ /− 50% and a precise periodic maintenance of period θ = 30 FH
– B.Fail possesses an exponential distribution with an imprecise failure rate
λ = 10−4+ /− 10% and a precise periodic maintenance of period θ = 35 FH
– S.stuck possesses an exponential distribution with a precise λ = 10−5
– An activation order of the Switch occurs after t = 80 FH
On Fig. 9, we can observe the minimum and maximum cumulative distri-
butions of the event Obs.KO, for a duration of 100 flight hours (around three
or four months for a commercial aircraft). The picture lays bare the effect of
periodic maintenance on those distributions.
Fig. 9. Evolution of the p-box of the event Obs.KO for a duration of 100 FHs
The study of this p-box can give crucial information about the probability of
undesired events, such as Obs.KO : when the area between the minimum curve
and the maximum curve is tight, computations are reliable. The larger it is,
the more uncertainty we will get. But even under uncertainty, it can still be
possible to ensure safety, if the upper probability of the undesired event is be-
low a legal threshold. For instance, in our case study, the maximum probability
is always less than 1.8×10−5 for 100 flight hours, with this maintenance schedule.
In safety analysis, the requirements to meet for each failure are described
in the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis document (FMEA, [10]). They are
classified with respect to their probability of occurrence, their severity and some
other features. This classification defines the legal probability threshold to be
met. In the example, the event Obs.KO meets a requirement of an event oc-
curring less than 10−4 over the 100 first flight hours, but not the threshold of
10−5. In case a threshold of 10−5 is required by the FMEA for this event, then
we must change the maintenance schedule in order to meet this requirement.
The algorithm allows to test easily several scenarios of maintenance, in order
to find one that ensures the threshold of 10−5. With a periodic maintenance
of the primary supplier every 19 flight hours instead of 25, and of the backup
supplier every 22 flight hours instead of 35, this requirement can be met despite
the uncertainty about the inputs, as shown on Fig. 10.
Fig. 10. A different scenario of maintenance schedule
The obtained p-box is also compatible with the fuzzy extension of FMEA
[11]. In this case, the threshold to meet for occurrence parameter is given by a
membership function over an ad hoc scale. After casting the probability interval
on such a scale, we can compute the necessity and the plausibility at each time
t.
6 Conclusion
Being able to model the impact of incomplete information on probabilistic safety
analysis is very useful for maintenance management. It allows the user to se-
lect the best representation for available data, in order to get a faithful advice.
Precise data can be used when they are available, but they do not need to be
assumed so when they are not. Consequently, more facets of uncertainty can be
taken into account, and especially the difference between the variability of fail-
ure times and the lack of knowledge on distribution parameters.This difference
can be very crucial in a decision process, where confidence about the results of
computations plays a decisive role.
The computation time of this algorithm is exponential with respect to logical
variables that appears both in positive and negative forms in the fault tree (in
practice there are very few of them [1]). Hence our methodology for risk analysis
in maintenance management looks scalable. Further experiments should be run
to demonstrate this point.
Future work will take into account the uncertainty of parameters represented
by means of fuzzy intervals, using the concept of α-cuts ([9]). In fact a fuzzy
set can be considered as a collection of nested (classical) intervals, called α-cuts.
For each α-cut, the range of the undesired event is computed. The issue is then
to find an algorithm to compose all these ranges into a fuzzy cumulative distri-
bution.
Acknowledgments. The authors would like to thank Christel Seguin (ON-
ERA, France) and Chris Papadopoulos (AIRBUS Operations Ltd., UK) for the
discussions about the application.
References
1. C. Jacob, D. Dubois, J. Cardoso: Uncertainty Handling in Quantitative BDD-Based
fault tree Analysis by Interval Computation, Int. Conf. on Scalable Uncertainty Man-
agement, Dayton, Ohio, S. Benferhat, J. Grant (Eds.), Springer, LNCS 6929, p.
205-218, 2011.
2. L. V. Utkin, F. P. A. Coolen: Imprecise reliability: An introductory overview, Intel-
ligence in Reliability Engineering, Springer, Vol. 40, p. 261-306, 2007.
3. M. Siegle: BDD extensions for stochastic transition systems, Proc. of 13th UK
Performance Evaluation Workshop, Ilkley/West Yorkshire, D. Kouvatsos ed, p. 9/1-
9/7, July 1997.
4. E. Morice: Quelques mode`les mathe´matiques de dure´e de vie, Revue de statistique
applique´e, tome 14, no1, p. 45-126, 1966.
5. F. Palisson: De´termination des parame`tres du mode`le de Weibull a` partir de la
me´thode de l’actuariat, Revue de statistique applique´e, tome 37, no 4, p. 5-39, 1989.
6. S. Ferson, L. Ginzburg, V. Kreinovich, D. Myers, K. Sentz: Constructing probability
boxes and Dempster-Shafer structures, Tech. rep., Sandia National Laboratories,
2003.
7. A. Rauzy: Mode automata and their compilation into into fault trees, Reliability
Engineering and System Safety, no 78, p. 1-12, 2002.
8. J. Gauthier, X. Leduc, A. Rauzy: Assessment of Large Automatically Generated
Fault Trees by means of Binary Decision Diagrams, Journal of Risk and Reliability.
Professional Engineering, Publishing. Vol. 221, no 2, p. 95-105, 2007.
9. L. Zadeh: Similarity relations and fuzzy orderings, Information Sciences, Vol. 3, p.
177-200, 1971.
10. D.H. Stamatis: Failure Mode Effect Analysis: FMEA from theory to execution,
2nd Edition, 1947.
11. K. M. Tay, C. P. Lim: A Guided Rule Reduction System for Prioritization of Fail-
ures in Fuzzy FMEA, International Journal of Quality and Reliability Management,
Vol. 23 Iss: 8, p.1047 - 1066, 2006.
